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Abstract
Disruptive developments in the field of information and communication tech-
nology have enabled malicious actors to turn elements of the digital ecosystem 
into information weapons in hybrid conflict.  Estonia has tackled the new security 
realm with comprehensive national defence that is built upon understanding that 
the society itself is object of security and should provide appropriate safeguards 
and responses. Estonian conceptualisations of national cybersecurity,  psychological 
defence, and strategic communications are elaborated in the light of actual semi-
nal threat situations. Analysis of evolvement of the strategic documents guides the 
recommendations for even deeper blend of the technical cybersecurity culture with 
value-centric psychological defence and internationalisation of information security 
situational awareness and planning.
Key Words: Estonia; Russia; Hybrid threats; Cyber; Psychological defence; Strategic 
communications (stratcom); Information warfar;, Information environment; Cyber-
space; Information weapon; Cyber weapon; Cybersecurity
Resumen 
Los avances disruptivos en el campo de la tecnología de la información y las 
comunicaciones han permitido a los actores malintencionados convertir elementos 
del ecosistema digital en armas de información en conflictos híbridos. Estonia ha 
abordado el nuevo ámbito de la seguridad con una defensa nacional integral que se 
basa en el entendimiento de que la propia sociedad es objeto de seguridad y debe 
proporcionar las salvaguardias y las respuestas adecuadas. Las conceptualizaciones 
estonias de la ciberseguridad nacional, la ciberdefensa psicológica y las comunica-
ciones estratégicas se elaboran a la luz de situaciones reales de amenazas seminales. 
El análisis de la evolución de los documentos estratégicos guía las recomendaciones 
para una combinación aún más profunda de la cultura técnica de ciberseguridad con 
la defensa psicológica centrada en el valor y la internacionalización de la planifica-
ción y el conocimiento de la situación de la seguridad de la información.
Palabras clave: Estonia; Rusia; Amenazas híbridas; Cyber; Defensa psicológica; Co-
municaciones estratégicas (stratcom); Warfar de información, entorno de informa-
ción; Ciberespacio; Arma de información; Arma cibernética; La seguridad cibernética
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Resumo
Desenvolvimentos disruptivos no campo da tecnologia da informação e comuni-
cação permitiram que atores maliciosos transformassem elementos do ecossistema 
digital em armas de informação em conflitos híbridos. A Estônia abordou o novo 
domínio da segurança com uma defesa nacional abrangente, baseada na compreen-
são de que a própria sociedade é objeto de segurança e deve fornecer salvaguardas 
e respostas adequadas. As conceituações estonianas de cibersegurança nacional, 
defesa psicológica cibernética e comunicações estratégicas são elaboradas à luz de 
situações reais de ameaças seminais. A análise da evolução dos documentos estraté-
gicos orienta as recomendações para uma mistura ainda mais profunda da cultura 
técnica de segurança cibernética com a defesa psicológica centrada em valores e a 
internacionalização da consciência situacional e do planejamento da segurança da 
informação.
Palavras chave: Estônia; Rússia; Ameaças híbridas; Cyber; Defesa psicológica; Co-
municações estratégicas (stratcom); Warfar de informação;, Ambiente de informa-
ção; Ciberespaço; Arma de informação; Arma cibernética; Cíber segurança
1. Introduction
The current case study elaborates Estonian comprehensive approach to national 
security.  Specifically, the informational instrument of power in international re-
lations and measures to secure domestic information environment are scrutinized. 
A suitable theoretical framework for analysis emerges from the Copenhagen 
school widened approach to security and societal security concept (Chifu, n.d.). 
The notion of having society as the object of security echoes loudly in analysed 
national security documents and in practical application of strategy in the fields of 
cybersecurity, psychological defence and building resilience against hybrid threats.
The authors have knowingly omitted force comparisons of realist schools’ hard 
security approach. Threats emanating via information environment deserve at-
tention in this scope as far as they can be considered political threats in the 
Buzanian terms (Buzan, 1991: 118-123). On several occasions technically similar 
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situations that cybersecurity and psychological defence are set to build resilience 
against, can occur as consequences of natural emergencies, a sophisticated crime 
or a manifestation of some ill-advised comments in the public information sphere. 
In that sense, the distinction between generic malware and cyber weapons from 
consequential, political and legal perspectives as described by Thomas Rid (2013: 
46-47) define if something deserves a national security label. 
The raison d’être of the Republic of Estonia is declared in the preamble of the 
Estonian constitution, ‘which must guarantee the preservation of the Estonian 
people, the Estonian language and the Estonian culture through the ages’ (1992). 
Barry Buzan highlights social vulnerabilities and threats that as ‘matters of lan-
guage, religion and local cultural tradition all play their part in the idea of the 
state’, hence deserve protection from state against hostile impacts to societal se-
curity (1991: 123, 19). This kind of securitization is not absolute and normally is 
not governing gradual linguistic development by loans, evolutionary development 
of peaceful subcultures, changes of individual religious beliefs among population 
or vivid cultural life far beyond traditional folk music and dances.
In recent years, there have occurred a heated public and academic discussion 
of “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid threats”— and on a number of closely related con-
cepts, some with precise definitions and some rather vague (e.g. election med-
dling, fake news, subversive leverage, information disorder, asymmetric war(fare), 
fourth-generation warfare, non-linear war(fare), non-traditional warfare, the ‘Ger-
asimov doctrine’, gray zone activities). This article does not seek to give any new 
definitions for the phenomenon itself, as authors agree with the European Com-
mission, which has stated:
While definitions of hybrid threats vary and need to remain flexible to respond 
to their evolving nature, the concept aims to capture the mixture of coercive 
and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplo-
matic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated 
manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remain-
ing below the threshold of formally declared warfare. There is usually an empha-
sis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity 
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to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using 
social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct 
proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats (European Commission, 2016). 
As seen here, the concept involves both technological (including cyber) and 
psychological vulnerabilities of a possible target country, therefore, the defence 
should also contain both these domains.
The most probable adversary using hybrid set of leverage means in the case of 
Estonia would be Russia. The Russian point of view was essentially defined in a 
speech and in an article by the head of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in 2013. It 
is worth noting that already then conflicts were considered to be a permanently 
ongoing process and not a theoretical occurrence of the future (Gerasimov, 2013). 
Both points have become more concise in latest iteration of official Russian mili-
tary doctrine (Kremlin, 2014). 
For the sake of clarity academic, working definitions of relevant concepts used 
in current article are provided as follows.
Information environment – IE is comprised of the information itself, the in-
dividuals, organisations and systems that receive, process and convey the infor-
mation, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs (MC 
0422/6, 2018: B-1). Dynamic physical and/or virtual settings interpreted by the 
mind (StratCom COE, 2019: 30).
Cyberspace - time-dependent set of interconnected information systems and the 
human users that interact with these systems (Ottis & Lorents, 2010).
Information weapon – selected or created targeted information, propagated log-
ical framework or a viral text intended to influence perception, judgements or 
behaviour of a target in the context of information conflict.
Cyber weapon – programs, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures used 
for offensive cyber operations (Growther, 2017); computer code that is used, or 
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designed to be used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional 
or mental harm to structures, systems, or living beings (Rid, 2013: 37). 
Strategic communications (stratcom) - A holistic approach to communication 
based on values and interests that encompasses everything an actor does to achieve 
objectives in a contested environment (StratCom COE, 2019: 31).
Psychological defence – development, preservation, and protection of common 
values associated with social cohesion and the sense of security (Estonian Parlia-
ment: 2010). 
National Cybersecurity – state of having national security safeguarded from 
threats emanating from network and information systems. (Estonian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, 2019:  40).
Information War(fare) would not be hereby defined as the concept has devel-
oped into too variative discourses from overenthusiastic proponents on reform 
in military affairs similar to advocates of air power in 1920s, from battlefield 
technicalities to geostrategic conceptualisations or to dystopias on fundamental 
alteration of human societies (Szafransky, 1995; Arquilla, 2007, p. 7-8; Potšeptsov, 
2009). Although in public debates on societal security ‘information war’ is often 
mentioned, the concept has defuncted among Western doctrine development and 
academic research circles.
2. Method
The narrative case study method is applied to study the intertwined wend of 
two conceptual security disciplines in Estonia. The case study approach has a rel-
atively long history in humanities and social sciences. 
For modern qualitative analysis one of the founding fathers of respective con-
temporary research methodology Robert K Yin (2013) describes the essence of 
case study as ’an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and con-
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text are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’ 
(p. 23). Bogden and Bilken (2003) define case study as “a detailed examination of 
one setting, or a single subject, a single depository of documents, or one particular 
event” (p. 54).
Narrative research originated from literature, history, anthropology, sociology, 
linguistics. Since the late 1980s and 1990s, research in the social sciences has 
taken “a sharp turn to narrative” (Clandinin, 2013, p. 10). Narrative approach is 
utilized here to provide a dynamic perspective of inferentiality in the chronologi-
cal order of the key events throughout the timeline of concepts.
In our overview, there are two cases provided: (1) the cyber case – from prime 
school educational digitalization of ’the Tiger Leap’ to world forerunner of cyber 
security; (2) the psychological defence case – from accommodation of constant 
attacks against ontological security of the state to recognized comprehensive psy-
chological defence model securing national identity and building societal resil-
ience. As the progress of the same protagonist (and in current case, the same 
antagonist) in the narrative evolves in the same timeframe, it would be useful to 
study the cases together.
3. Development
3.1. Cases of realisation of information-related hybrid threats in 
Estonia
Hostile influence activities against Estonian nation’s popular aspiration for re-
gaining independence from the East did not cease with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Nonetheless, dealing with active measures1 of the Russian Federation were 
rather considered as matter of close professional counterintelligence circles not a 
central tenet of national security until 2017.
The crisis in Estonia in the spring of 2007 that escalated around the World War II 
memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue is remembered in Estonia mostly due to 
two nights of rioting in the capital. Abroad the main emphasis has been on the first 
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ever cyber-attacks conducted by one country against another (Singer & Friedman, 
2014). The first signs of coordinated Russian action could be noticed in January 2007, 
when diplomatic pressure and high levels of media coverage began and, probably, the 
secret services received their marching orders. In March and April, semi-clandestine 
meetings were detected between one of the leading figures of the soon-to-be rioters 
and Russian diplomats. By April tensions were high and on 26 April these escalated to 
rioting of a mainly Russian-speaking crowd. The following days witnessed economic 
and diplomatic pressure from Russia (even a demand for the Estonian government 
to resign), a blockade and attacks on the Estonian Embassy and on the Ambassador 
in Moscow by members of a pro-Kremlin youth organisation, and aggressive media 
coverage. Activity in social media—then still in its infancy, consisting of forums and 
below-the-line commentaries on the websites of media outlets—was extensive and 
included the use of a doctored image showing the iconic statue of the Bronze Soldier 
being cut up. Cyber-attacks on Estonian state institutions and businesses (notably 
the media and the banks) began sporadically on 27 April and were followed by four 
massive waves on 4 May, 8–10 May, 15 May and 18 May. (Juurvee & Mattiisen, 2020).
Such mixture of leverages – what now is called ‘hybrid’ – was new at the time. 
The nature of cyber-attacks was changing and their intensity grew from relatively 
simple means, even earning the label “cyber riots”, to more dangerous DoS (denial 
of service) attacks and finally well-coordinated DDoS (distributed denial of ser-
vice) attacks. (Tikk, Kaska & Vihul, 2010).
Next time the politically motivated cyber-attacks were noticed in Estonia was 
during the NATO military exercise Steadfast Jazz 2013 that followed Russian ex-
ercise in Western Military District Zapad-13. On 7 November 2013 a defacing at-
tack against the Estonian railway company Elron – the sole company providing 
local passenger train connections in the country¬– occurred. It stated everybody 
visiting the website in clumsy and erroneous Estonian: “Train traffic in Estonia 
has been cancelled: Due to ongoing NATO exercises Steadfast Jazz 2013 the railway 
traffic and passenger services are temporarily cancelled” (Kaukvere, 2013). On the 
next day a number of organizations received a fake email on behalf of the head of 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence situated in Estonian capital 
Tallinn, with strange content, claiming that Centre is carrying out information se-
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curity audit of their organization as a part of the exercise Steadfast Jazz (Kovacs, 
2019). At the same time DDoS attacks went off against targets in Estonia, Latvia, 
and Ukraine. Russian media misleadingly attributed the attacks to CCDCOE as a 
part of a NATO exercise gone wrong (ICDS, 2013).
Although Estonia has later faced some potentially serious cyber-attacks – most nota-
bly against VKG chemical products concern possibly originating from APT28 aka Russian 
military intelligence (Estonian Information System Authority, 2016, 23; FireEye, 2014) – 
these have not been used in coordination with other components of hybrid leverage. The 
advanced use of cyber means for influence activities has been confronted continually. 
One example is from January 2019, when Facebook removed 364 “pages and accounts 
for engaging in coordinated inauthentic behaviour as part of a network that originated 
in Russia”, some of them where operating against target audiences in Estonia. Facebook 
Head of Cybersecurity Policy noticed that “despite their misrepresentations of their iden-
tities, we found that these Pages and accounts were linked to employees of Sputnik, a 
news agency based in Moscow, and that some of the Pages frequently posted about topics 
like anti-NATO sentiment, protest movements, and anti-corruption” (Gleicher, 2019).
Influence operations and cyber-attacks have held protuberant place in public 
threat perception within the dozen years following the 2007 Bronze Soldier crisis 
as national security polls reflect (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2020).
During the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic Estonians considered informa-
tion-related threats among the most pressing to Estonia. From the respondents to 
a national security poll 87% considered cyber-attacks being a threat of major or 
some extent to peace and security of Estonia. Proliferation of disinformation and 
fake news earned same rating. Spread of epidemics and global economic crisis were 
referred just 4-5% more (Turu-Uuringute, 2020: 16).
3.2. Strategy documents: cyber security, psychological defence, 
strategic communications
The National Security Concept (NSC) 2010, adopted by the Parliament in May 
2010, introduced a change in security thinking although the roots can be traced 
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back to earlier documents. It stated that “Estonia’s security policy is based on 
a broad concept of security, entailing all trends affecting security and essential 
areas required for ensuring security.” The analysis of security environment had 
changed substantially since adoption of previous NSC and becoming a NATO mem-
ber in 2004. According to NSC 2010, Estonia as a democratic, open society could 
be affected by the spread of extremist, hostile or hate-based ideologies. Such ten-
dencies might weaken social cohesion, reduce tolerance and cause social tension. 
According to document in the environmental context of open and free media the 
“attacks against cohesion of Estonian society necessitate greater attention to the 
sense of cohesion and psychological defence.” Uneven regional development and 
poorly adapting social groups could affect internal stability. The strengthening 
of civil society and the continuity in integration process were seen as reinforcing 
factors of Estonia’s security. The answer to such vulnerabilities had to be broad. 
The document defined six pillars of the national defence that would be implement-
ed comprehensively and were more-or-less the same as are in force now: military 
defence, civil contribution to military defence, international activity, ensuring 
of internal security, securing the resilience of critical services, and psychological 
defence (Estonian Parliament, 2010). From the point of view of this research paper 
psychological defence is hereby the most important since it is dealing directly with 
society’s resilience or “kerksus” in Estonian, as it is known now (Juurvee, 2018). 
The document stated that psychological defence is emanating from constitu-
tional values and serves to enforce Estonia’s security thus defining the foundations 
and general aim. NSC 2010 also gave a more precise definition: “Psychological 
defence is the development, preservation and protection of common values asso-
ciated with social cohesion and the sense of security.” The aim of psychological 
defence was foreseen as safeguarding the security of the state and the society, 
enhancing the sense of security, averting crisis and increasing trust amongst so-
ciety and towards the actions taken by the state. Psychological defence had to 
facilitate the strengthening of “nation’s self-confidence and the will to defend Es-
tonia.” Psychological defence and the recognition of constitutional values were to 
strengthen the resilience to avert anti-Estonian subversive activity. Additionally 
the document foresaw the development of psychological defence in co-operation 
with “all members of civil society.” NSC 2010 named harmonized regional devel-
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opment and integration also as fields of internal security (Estonian Parliament, 
2010).
Although adopted on the highest possible level – the Parliament – NSC 2010 
still did not provide the public service and society in general precise instructions 
for building up the psychological defence. Such guidelines were provided by the 
Government of the Republic in a document adopted at the last day of the very 
same year: the National Defence Strategy (NDS), valid since 1 January 2011. NDS 
foresaw three main lines of action for psychological defence:
a.  Identifying hostile influences and protecting against them; 
b.  Rising the endurance of public broadcasting services relevant networks are 
attacked; 
c.  Enhancing the public will to engage in defence and the popularisation of 
security-related thinking (Estonian Government, 2010).
NDS 2011 also pointed out aspects of psychological defence that should be tak-
en into account when developing the following fields:
a. Notifying the population of the risks and developing its knowledge and skills 
for crisis situation; 
b. Solving emergency situations and informing the population in such situa-
tions; 
c. Improving Estonia’s international image.
The document also set responsibilities and stakeholders for planning of the filed. 
The Government Office became the coordinator and contributors were the Ministry 
of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Research, the Ministry of the Interior, the Rescue Board, the Defence 
Forces and national security institutions (Estonian Government, 2010). While such 
list in general makes sense, oddly enough the Ministry of Social Affairs was not 
included. 
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The activities envisioned in the documents did stay on paper only. Although 
the information in public domain is limited there are some public references of 
developments in public reports. In the following years the possible threats were 
analysed and requirement raising from the analysis were integrated into political 
and operational planning, manuals, training system and exercises. Psychological 
defence was developed in international cooperation and involving the domestic 
public, organizing different conferences and workshops to meet that end (Esto-
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, 2). Members of civil society, academics, 
journalists and public servants discussed the topic in the newly formed format of 
Psyhological Defence Courses (Arold, 2014). 
The public discussion about psychological defence started already in March 
2011 as a reaction to the article “People and nations have a right for informational 
self-determination” by the member of the Estonian Academy of Sciences and the 
Minister of Defence Jaak Aaviksoo (Aaviksoo, 2011). Following debate in press was 
rather heated and although it soon lost its momentum, its implications cannot 
considered to be over, yet. Academic study of the discussion was conducted several 
years later in 2015 using in-depth interviews with public servants, journalists and 
opinion-leaders, some of whom had been actively expressing their opinions on the 
press. It concluded that in general there was an agreement that the concept of 
psychological defence is needed and its main idea is to protect the mentality and 
values of Estonias’ society against hostile information-based (influence) opera-
tions. Respondents found that coherent actions should be carried out by security 
and communication professionals and these should reinforce community’s value 
system. On the other hand, the abstraction of psychological defence was not un-
derstood unambiguously by Estonian security policymakers (Narits, 2015).
Next phase of active public discussion on the societal resilience in Estonia fol-
lowed the Russian military action in Ukraine in 2014. Although some new terms 
like hybrid warfare appeared in discourse, it did not provide securitization of new 
fields that would concern this research paper. Rather the arguments pointed out 
in 2007-2010 were repeated and dealt in more concise form. While dealing with 
the topic in 2014 the adviser of the Government Office pointed out, that for public 
servants psychological defence means awareness of current informational threats 
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while writing planning documents, comprehensiveness of exercises and public en-
gagements, and keeping in mind the preamble of the Constitution. He also un-
derlined the contribution of each citizen, because everybody could be exposed to 
direct or indirect hostile influences that should be recognized in order to avoid 
becoming an useful idiot2 spreading panic or disinformation (Arold, 2014).
European refugee crisis starting in 2015 influenced public discourse in Estonia 
and contributed to securitization of manifestations of intolerance (Raag & Günter, 
2016). Such debates found their way to doctrinal documents with speed that was 
unseen previously. New version of the NSC adopted in 2017 does not change the 
essence of the previous NSC 2010. The comprehensive approach to security remains 
central in NSC 2017. However, it successfully describes the main current challeng-
es for societal security. Uneven regional development, social inequality, poverty, 
poorly adapted segments of society or manifestations of intolerance were seen as 
factor that could affect the stability of the state. The polarisation of society due 
to adversarial opinions and understandings were pointed out as situation that 
increases uncertainty and decreases society’s resilience. The document has a spe-
cial chapter (3.8) dedicated to resilience and cohesion of society which provides 
narrower focus for psychological defence and introduces a new term - strategic 
communication (Estonian Parliament, 2010).
Estonia considers itself as a digitally advanced country. According to World 
Bank estimations Estonia is among one of the handful countries becoming truly 
digital society. (Ross, 2016, pp. 5, 248; World Bank, 2016, pp. 17,54). According 
to the National Cyber Security Index, Estonia is ranked No. 3 in among 160 states. 
Voluntary societal engagement in crisis preparedness on the field of cyber security 
deserves furthermost distinction (NCSI, 2020). Cyber enthusiasm has not always 
been thoroughly accompanied with realisation of risks accompanied with digitali-
zation of governmental and commercial services.
The cyber defence, although mentioned in the National Security Concept, used to be 
more widely covered in different documents. Again, the main motivator behind these 
documents were the cyber-attacks in spring 2007 – until then the documents dealing 
with development of  information infrastructure did not go further than just mention-
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ing the importance of security. The major step forward was the Cyber Defence Strategy 
2008-2013. The document contains a wish-list for future developments and defines the 
aim of cyber security as “decreasing vulnerability of cyber domain of the state as whole” 
(Estonian Government, 2008). The next iteration of the document foresaw the objective 
for next four years as “increase[ing] cyber security capabilities and people’s awareness 
of cyber threats to ensure continued confidence in cyberspace” thus binding the psy-
chological defence and cyber defence together (Estonian Ministry Economic Affairs and 
Communications, 2013). In the third iteration of the document, in force during writing 
of this article, the desired state of affairs by 2022 was defined followingly: “Estonia is a 
sustainable digital society with strong technological resilience and crisis preparedness” 
(Estonian Ministry Economic Affairs and Communications, 2017).
Current Estonian national security concept is rather descriptive in its language. 
Therefore, it is possible to identify highlighted components and vivid priorities of 
information-related security disciplines from the time of approval, but not defini-
tions. Strategic communications and psychological defence are described as com-
plemented disciplines dealing with the societal fabric and communicative realm. 
Strategic communication (stratcom) provides generic communicative prism to all 
words and deeds of the executive branch of state power. Effectiveness of stratcom 
is built upon societally negotiated formulation of democratic values for the sake of 
national cohesion. Notion on stratcom as a dialogue platform with society consid-
ers domestic population as its stakeholder as well as its target audience. 
The core of psychological defence is defined around protection of constitutional 
values that implicitly are non-negotiable. The set of measures described in the 
concept do not limit psychological defence with communicative means only, as it 
includes prevention and neutralisation of publicly insinuated armed insurgencies 
with domestic or imported origin. This is to be done together with civic society 
stakeholders. However, if possible, threats are preferably mitigated just by expos-
ing them by public education. (Estonian Parliament, 2017). 
The official document does not contain any schematic. In academic literature 
this is still available. Most often described scheme of psychological defence is de-
picted on Figure 1 (Rebane, 2009; Jantunen, 2015: 316; Arold: 2020).
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Figure 1: Estonian psychological defence model.
In the model constitutional values have the central stage. Wide acceptance of 
constitutional values enables other societal security components relevant to psy-
chological defence. All other components are vulnerable from weakening of other 
components. In this paradigm role of cybersecurity is reflected as systematic tech-
nical enabler for quality of communication environment. Strategic communication 
capability has its play in formation of internationally intertwined security setup 
(by consolidating instruments of power for communication effects). 
Functions of strategic communication and cybersecurity in the context of con-
stitutional values does not provide the full picture, yet. In the quality of commu-
nication environment self-regulatory mechanisms play the pivotal role. Editorial 
independence and professionalism of private and public media are quintessential. 
There is no law on journalism in Estonia. However, self-regulatory traditions cov-
ering public and competing private media houses are strong.
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For the sake of cybersecurity minimizing number of vulnerable computer users 
is propagated under cyber hygiene label from the very beginning, and not only 
in coding classes for 7-year-olds (Olson, 2012). In a wider context, importance of 
information hygiene (media literacy + cyber hygiene) is instructed. It is advised 
not to be ‘contaminated’ with fake news and become an involuntary disseminator 
(an ‘useful idiot’) of viral texts/memes or computer viruses. (Kahar, 2008; Rebane 
2019: 165-173, Vaarik: 2014: 260, 268-275, Arold, 2015). 
Viability of culture (preservance of national identity) is the unavoidable prereq-
uisite for any strategic communication plans and psychological defence measures 
as the constitution and national security concept prescribe.  However, modern 
founding fathers could not have foreseen that being a digitally highly capable 
nation forerunning international cybersecurity agenda might attain such a prom-
inent role as a national identity marker. Importantly, this has been the conse-
quence of consensual narrative framing of cyber-attacks of 2017 (Clarke & Knake, 
2010: 11-17,20; Rebane, 2020; Alenius, 2013).
Cohesion of society describes not just ends of the strategy. It involves enhance-
ment of number of societal human links (both technologically moderated and 
analogous) in order to advance societal integration and to strengthen endurance 
of the society as a system.
3.3. Institutional evolution of dealing with cyber threats
Although Estonia had paid much attention on ICT developments already in 
1990ies, the security issues were addressed through the prism of data protection 
(Siil, 2001). Even after the major reorganization started in 2003 that ended with 
creation of new official body the Estonian Informatics Development Centre, only one 
of its core functions was “organization of activities connected to data protection in 
the state information systems” (Estonian Minister of Economy and Communications, 
2005). Break-through on institutional sense was establishing Estonian Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT-EE) at the beginning of 2006 – it was done well 
prior to the 2007 cyber-attacks, not vice versa. As the Permanent Undersecretary of 
the Estonian Ministry of Defence has recalled, the intelligence services had predicted 
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a cyber-attack taking into account the high reliance of Estonia on e-services, howev-
er, these were not forecasted for late April, but rather for March 2007 when the first 
internet voting on parliamentary elections took place in Estonia. The solution from 
Estonian Government was cooperation between different state and private entities, 
especially banking sector (Mansfield-Devine, 2012).
In the military domain cyber defence evolved on different pace. In late 2003 
Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, head for the Allied Command Transformation 
visited Estonian Commander of Defence General Johhannes Kert. At the time NATO 
was initiating establishment of network of Centres of Excellence (CoEs) and Ad-
miral mentioned that Estonia, known for its IT know-how should show some ini-
tiative in the field of cyber defence. General Kert was eager to seize the chance. 
In the following year the idea was refined and lobbying done both in- and outside 
Estonia. The building for the soon-to-be NATO CoE was finished already in 2006 
(Kaljula & Suurkask, 2019). At the same year the concept of Cooperative Cyber 
Defence CoE proposed by Estonia in 2004 after joining NATO, was approved by 
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) was officially established in Tallinn on 14 May 
2008. The North-Atlantic Council gave full accreditation and status International 
Military Organizaton to the Centre in October the same year (NATO CCD COE, 2020).
As shown above, the 2007 cyber-attacks did not initiate the foundation of 
CERT-EE and NATO CCD COE, oddly enough the decisions had been made well prior 
to these attacks. However, they certainly gave some boost to the topic of cyber 
defence both domestically and internationally. While the earlier cyber-attacks tar-
geting private business were frequently kept quiet about by the victims, this time 
the communication was much different – the incidence were widely talked about 
and such decision was made on the level of President, Prime Minister and Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs. As former head of CERT-EE Hillar Aarelaid has pointed out, 
“Without the events of 2007 we would not have been able to connect Estonia with 
the topic of cyber defence” (Lõugas, 2017). Therefore, through orchestrated ap-
proach to communication fencing off the cyber-attacks became an important tool 
of communication itself.
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Later years have provided only one major structural chance with reorganizing Es-
tonian Informatics Development Centre into Information System Authority (although 
different names in English, they seem rather similar in Estonian and even share the 
same abbreviation – RIA – that may cause some confusion) in 2011. Compared to ear-
lier, the importance of security among the functions of RIA had considerably raised. In 
2011 CERT-EE was listed on the seventh place among the ten functional departments 
of the Information System Authority (Estonian Minister of Economy and Communica-
tions, 2011). Continuation of such trend is clearly visible in the next iterations of the 
Authority’s statute, by 2020 it takes the first place among the 12 functional depart-
ments listed in statute (Estonian Minister of Economy and Communications, 2020).
4. Conclusions
Estonian approach to the cerebral aspects of information security looks vital 
in its comprehensiveness. However, official conceptualisation fails to explain the 
rationale of building psychological defence and executing strategic communication 
in parallel veins. Both functions are essentially planned and co-ordinated by the 
same office and seek similar ends. Distinction of ways and means between the 
disciplines looks artificial. Strategic Communication principles could be practically 
extended to non-securitized areas of policy planning. Psychological defence as 
an essentially security function has deeper roots in the legislative history, but is 
built on a more contested ground as a more innovative and precedential notion 
compared to other states’ security setup. It would be advisable to use term ‘strate-
gic communications’ for governmental communication practices that contribute to 
informing policy decisions, while reserving psychological defence as a sole notion 
for securitized communicative decisions and capability development.
The national security concept frames cybersecurity, psychological defence and 
strategic communication through same lanes as a matter of resilience – prepara-
tion, endurance and ability to revitalize in case of attacks.  However, development 
of cyber security according to national security strategy is rather technical and 
does not account notions of cultural impacts. Psychological defence as a societal 
security concept is not precise enough to inform message and platform related 
issues in the digital realm. 
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Informatization of contemporary societies prescribe closer integration of the func-
tions. It is understandable, that cyber as a conflict domain could not become an in-
dependent key pillar of national defence (otherwise Estonia should consider compre-
hensive naval, airspace and ground securities according to the same logic). As the 
definitions of information environment and cyberspace, information weapon and cyber 
weapon, strategic communications / psychological defence and national cybersecuri-
ty hint, cyber is generally a subset of information and the challenges of information 
warfare should be met with joint information security. In this context system-centric 
cyber-defence and value-centric psychological defence complement each other.
There is already a 3rd iteration of cyber security strategy in force in Estonia. 
The authors were not able to identify continual doctrinal process for psychological 
defence. Cyber security strategy considers national cybersecurity in a globalized 
world, deals with Estonian positions regarding jurisdiction and legal norming of 
malicious cyber activities. In essence, context of cybersecurity is the world. 
Psychological defence in 2010 national defence strategy does have a say about 
the playground being borderless media space where threats emerge and effects are 
gained. The latest national security concept permits psychological defence means to 
be international, whereas strategic communication is limited to own society during 
state of normality. The objective information environment remains the same for 
technical and cultural influences. Therefore, considering not only possible threats, 
but capability building and operations in international arena would make sense. 
Estonian case study on securitization of communication and means of commu-
nication provides insight on reasons why system-centric and value-centric policies 
have developed in different veins. 
The uncontested need for cybersecurity in a digitally dependent society has 
resulted fast-track conceptual developments pioneering even on global scale. 
Obviously, value-centric psychological defence needs more time to mature in 
the societal establishment and would probably remain slightly controversial for-
ever, at least in the eyes of conspirologists, agents of influence and useful idiots.
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Notes
[1] Active measures is a term from KGB vocabulary and was defined as “agent-operational meas-
ures aimed at exerting useful influence on aspects of the political life of a target country 
which are of interest, its foreign policy, the solution of international problems, misleading 
the adversary, undermining and weakening his positions, the disruption of his hostile plans, 
and the achievement of other aims.” (Mitrokhin, 2002).
[2] Useful idiot – a person who is easy to persuade to do, say, or believe things that help a par-
ticular group or another person politically. (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020).
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